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Abstract 
 
There are arguments for determinism. Admittedly, this is opposed by the fact of everyday 
experience of autonomy. In the following, it is argued for the compatibility of determi-
nism and autonomy. Taking up considerations of Donald MacKay, a fatalistic attitude can 
be refuted as false. Repeatedly, attempts have been made to defend the possibility of auto-
nomy with reference to quantum physical indeterminacy. But its statistical randomness 
clearly misses the meaning of autonomy. What is decisive, on the other hand, is the possi-
bility of knowledge, which opens up opportunities for planning, freedom of choice and ul-
timately 'self-choice'. Results of neurobiological research, especially Benjamin Libet's and 
more recently John-Dylan Haynes', seem to refute this: Actions are unconsciously initiated 
before conscious decision. But, as Libet has also shown, consciousness always has the 
possibility of a veto – and thus also of knowledge-driven action control. Ultimately, the 
idea of possible self-choice can thus become the determining condition. Only such a form 
of rational self-determination establishes a spiritual identity and at the same time repre-
sents the maximum of autonomy possible for human beings. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The problem of freedom has been thought through again and again in the philo-
sophical tradition, but is still unsolved today. 1980 a book has been published by Ulrich 
Pothast with the provocative title 'Die Unzulänglichkeit der Freiheitsbeweise' (The Insuf-
ficiency of Proofs of Freedom) (Pothast 1980). The merit of this work lies in the fact that 
it goes through – and refutes – all types of proofs of freedom known from the philosophi-
cal tradition. Pothast's arguments amount to determinism, i.e. the view that everything that 
happens, including our actions and thoughts, is determined by countless factors. This posi-
tion is to be subjected to closer examination, which will lead to a more differentiated as-
sessment. 
This view is disturbing in two respects: On the one hand, we are convinced, accor-
ding to our self-image, that freedom belongs to the essence of man. Secondly, philo-
sophers believe they have excellent arguments against determinism. 
In my opinion, the strongest objection against determinism is the following – it goes 
back to Heinrich Rickert (1921) and has been further elaborated and specified in the con-
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text of Analytical Philosophy (e.g. Boyle/Grisez/Tollefsen 1976 – see also Pothast 1980, 
Chapter VII). The argument: Truth, i.e. the correct recognition of a fact, is only possible 
for me if in my recognising I can engage in the factual situation. The prerequisite for this 
is, however, that I am not determined by extraneous constraints – such as physical factors 
or my biological-genetic constitution, but also not by prejudices and hardened opinions. 
Because of such constraints, my recognition would be systematically distorted, not appro-
priate to the object. Objective cognition would be impossible. In a nutshell, this means: 
truth requires freedom. 
Now determinism, as a philosophical theory, claims truth itself, which in turn, ac-
cording to what has just been said, presupposes freedom. But determinism denies the pos-
sibility of freedom: a contradiction, it seems, which discredits determinism as a logically 
inconsistent, self-refuting position. The argument appears captivating. It seems to be an 
absolutely valid objection, which deals the deathblow to determinism. But this considera-
tion does not stand up to closer scrutiny. Praise God, because we are indeed determined in 
many ways, but we still hope that true knowledge is not impossible, at least in principle 
(otherwise further considerations would be superfluous here). 
In fact, rational thinking has conditions – both logical and empirical: first and fore-
most, it is subject to logical rules. But also the ability to follow these rules must obviously 
be trained. The scientist, too, does not fall from the sky, but is shaped by heredity, sociali-
zation, study, etc. He needs a minimum of intelligence, a good education, a lot of motiva-
tion, discipline and not to forget: also frustration tolerance and of course a little bit of 
luck. In short: Also the ability to recognize has its conditions. 
But what is the consequence? Freedom for human beings – in traditional terms – is 
obviously only freedom of choice, not freedom of will: Freedom of choice refers to the 
possibility that I can do this or that as I please, so autonomy. This means, on the one hand, 
that circumstances do not prevent me from doing this or that; on the other hand, autonomy 
is rooted in my subject structure, which, as I have said, must be regarded as being deter-
mined in many ways: by character, needs, desires and goals, but also by intellectual com-
petence, horizons of understanding, etc. Freedom of will, on the other hand, would mean 
that my actions are not only independent of external and internal constraints, but also that 
it would be independent of myself, so to speak – undoubtedly an absurd idea. So the only 
reasonable possibility is autonomy, understood as freedom of choice, which in an essential 
sense includes conditionality, determination. Is a deterministic conception thus inevitable? 
In the following I would like to show in several steps in which sense the determination of 
man, which cannot be denied, not only does not exclude autonomy, but only makes it pos-
sible at all – together with a rehabilitation of the above-mentioned argument 'truth requi-
res freedom' (see ch. 6). 
 
2. Fatalistic Consequences? 
 
A central problem in this context concerns my thinking and decision-making. For if 
this is determined, this seems to suggest a fatalistic attitude: Determination appears as a 
fate from which I can no more escape than Oedipus can escape his. So didn't I just need to 
wait and see what happens to me? Because obviously whatever I do, that must happen – 
with all the ethically disastrous consequences. 
I'm sitting in a café, for example, and outside in the lake a person is fighting against 
drowning. As a fatalist I would perhaps say: 'To save him: then I would have to get up and 
plunge into the water. But I think I am now determinated to drink coffee'. I am trying to 
justify the failure to render help here with an alleged fate. As a fatalist I assume that my 
future decisions are already fixed now. So, basically, you could also know them in advan-
ce. Today, the idea that a brain researcher would be able to calculate my future actions ba-
sed on his research data no longer seems absurd (critical to this Wetzel 2007; more detai-
led in chapter 5). 
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Well, a fatalism cannot be justified from there, as an interesting argument shows, 
which can be found, with different accentuation, for example with Henri Bergson (1911), 
Max Planck (1936), Karl R. Popper (1950) and Donald MacKay (1978). I would like to 
reproduce here the thought experiment discussed by MacKay: He starts from the assump-
tion that a neuroscientist is able to precisely measure the state of my brain and to conclude 
from this on my subsequent actions. It is clear, I think, that this is a maximum assumption, 
perhaps a bit of science fiction, but we are dealing with a thought experiment (but see ch. 
6!). So if my actions could be predicted in this way by a scientist, then two cases are pos-
sible: (1) He can hide his knowledge from me; then only he knows how I will act, I myself 
remain unaware of it. (2) Or he tells me his knowledge, and I may or may not believe him. 
Through the communication, however, my brain state changes and with it also my motiva-
tional state and disposition for action, in other words: If the knowledge about my brain 
state is communicated to me, this knowledge becomes false precisely because of this. In 
the first case, the observer could indeed know my future actions in advance, as long as he 
does not inform me; but then I myself do not have this knowledge in any case. But in the 
second case, when he communicates it to me, this knowledge becomes obsolete by the act 
of communication itself. Howsoever, so everyone himself is always in the situation that he 
basically is not fixed in his future actions by the knowledge of his present state of brain. 
(A supplement to this is made in chapter 6.) Pothast refers to this case of a knowledge-
related non-determination as epistemic indeterminism, i.e. indeterminism on the epistemic 
level (Pothast 1978, 21). 
From an ethical point of view, the stated matter of fact of an epistemic indeterminism is 
momentous. For the fatalistic argumentation is thereby deprived of the ground. All arguments 
with an alleged fate of having to do or not having to do something specific are wrong and are 
therefore in no way suitable for justifying actions or omissions. – Only so much here about the 
ethical aspect, which appears again and again in the context of the problem of freedom, but 
remains largely ignored here (enlightening on this Bieri 2005, esp. ch. 9). 
Now, epistemic indeterminism is a subjective indeterminism; any objective determi-
nation remains unaffected. This would, of course, collide with the fact of everyday expe-
rience of autonomy, which consists, for example, in the evidence that we lead our lives – 
we plan the day, we work towards a distant goal, yes, with Sartre one could even say in a 
certain sense: we design ourselves. Sure, this is a big word, but compared to the absolute 
situational dependence of the animal – "close- tethered ... at the stake of the moment", as 
Nietzsche says (1874, 5) – not absurd. We have seen that there are also many determinants 
at play. Nevertheless, the possibility of planning one's life remains a fascinating fact that 
suggests autonomy, i.e. freedom of choice according to my subjective plan of action, and 
the question is then: Is autonomy conceivable in view of the multiple conditionalities in 
which we exist? Or in short: Is autonomy compatible with determination? 
 
3. System Autonomy Under Laws of Nature 
 
In this context at first the physical aspect is to be considered (instructive on this is-
sue Earman 1986). The starting point is the consideration that human acts of will are ine-
vitably linked to thought processes and thus brain processes. However, as physico-
chemical processes, these are subject to the laws of nature and should thus – according to 
classical physical understanding – be strictly determined. In this perspective, there seems 
to be no freedom even in thinking. Physical determinism seems to determine the mind no 
less than the course of the stars – truly a vision of horror! 
One way to escape this consequence seemed to open up with the development of 
quantum theory. If the network of cause and effect is absolutely tightly woven according 
to classical physics, this is no longer true from a quantum physics perspective. Quantum 
theory – at least in its established form – contains indeterministic elements. It seemed that 
this was the way to save freedom from the deterministic approach of classical physics. 
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According to the ideas of quantum physics, there are, so to speak, 'gaps' in the causal net-
work, and it seemed that autonomy could be established in these gaps. 
Such a proposal was already made by Pascual Jordan more than 60 years ago (Jor-
dan 1956, 63 ff, 114 ff). A similar argument is still used in the book by Peter Rohs (Rohs 
1996, ch. 20 f), who sees the fundamental compatibility of freedom and physics secured 
by this.    
Here, of course, the question arises: What could the quantum-physical indetermi-
nism thus occupied do for the concept of freedom? In quantum theory, strict causality has 
been replaced by statistical chance. A freedom of human action understood in this way 
would thus be nothing other than the randomness of roulette-like processes. Could we be 
satisfied with that? Should freedom be nothing but senseless chance? To save freedom in 
this way would probably mean sacrificing its meaning. Freedom is hardly to locate in a 
quantum physical 'gap' in the causal network. 
Then however a further question becomes urgent: How can our thinking be subject 
to physical determination and same time be independent of coincidental environmental 
conditions (time of day, weather, moon phase etc.), e.g. when it comes to produce correct 
logical relations? The answer is: Because man, as a physical system, is primarily subject 
to specific system laws that are independent of environmental conditions – within a certain 
range of fluctuation. Even the television set functions independently of the state of the 
stars. 
General: Systems are characterized by inherent laws. This gives them a certain sy-
stem-specific autonomy, i.e. independence from the system environment, but in such a 
way – this is essential – that physically everything is done with right things. The laws of 
nature apply unchanged to the system. But it is a system precisely because it integrates its 
elements into the functional unit of the system. These so become components of the sy-
stem, and as such they are not something that is external to the system. Rather, they con-
stitute the system, which in turn depends primarily on its components and not on the sy-
stem environment. In other words: System autonomy simply belongs to the concept of the 
system, it is constitutive for the system by virtue of the natural causal relationship consti-
tuted by its components. Other, non-classical laws of nature are not required for this, and 
certainly not a 'gap in the causal network' that would destroy system autonomy at all. 
So much for the side of physical determination, which is clearly compatible with au-
tonomy from the environment; I would like to speak briefly of system autonomy. With 
this, a further elementary aspect of autonomy has become visible in the deterministic con-
text. 
 
4. Autonomy Through Knowledge – 'Self Choice' 
 
Now, essential for the relationship between autonomy and determination in man is 
the possibility of knowledge, and that means that he can determine his actions by self-
chosen reasons. Since reasons belong to knowledge, they have an ideal character. As 
such, they are to be strictly distinguished from causes that are energetic in character and 
thus act causally on the human physiological and drive system. It is not surprising that 
this distinction of causes and reasons is one of the central points of the current discussion 
about freedom of will. For this option of determining oneself through reasons is obviously 
a genuine human possibility. When in the following we speak briefly of 'knowledge', then 
this always means reasons originating from knowledge, i.e. ideal determinants of action, 
not energetic causes. 
What is decisive here is that the horizon of knowledge extends far beyond the im-
mediate present. Thus, the ability to think and to know represents, in comparison with the 
animal, a tremendous liberation from the ever factual circumstances. The already mentio-
ned everyday consciousness of autonomy, which we have even without philosophy, has its 
origin in this. Through the detachment from the immediate situation and emotive state of 
mind, it is possible for me to lead my life autonomously, i.e. to plan, to orientate towards 
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distant goals and to hold this direction even against resistance. Shure, the formation of this 
autonomy also has determining conditions. But the result of such determination is a gigan-
tically expanded perspective compared to the animal, which we therefore experience as 
freedom rather than determination. In this sense I would like to speak of an autonomy 
through knowledge. 
But that is still too general: I have not only world knowledge, but also knowledge of 
my knowledge, knowledge of myself, self-consciousness. So I also know that I can know, 
and that also means that I can expand my ever limited knowledge, that I can shift my li-
mits in this respect almost at will. With this, a further, quite essential aspect of the relati-
onship between autonomy and determination becomes visible: In self-consciousness, in 
turning back to myself, I discover, beyond the possibilities that lie in the ever factual 
knowledge, that I can make such possibilities possible myself, or in other words: that I can 
overcome factual limitations and, as it were – á la Sartre – 'design' myself as the person I 
want to be – a further, unbelievable expansion of freedom of choice, which, with a Kier-
kegaardian term, has the character of self-choice. In the perspective of self-conscious self-
choice, I see myself as a being that is not fixed on anything definitively and is therefore 
autonomous in a fundamental sense. This is briefly called autonomy as self-choice. 
Despite my factual predisposition I am therefore sure that this does not bind me in 
the end. Certainly, my decisions on how to act are also determined by internalized social 
norms, but 'when it comes down to it' – that is also certain – I can also question them and, 
if necessary, replace them with others. In short, nothing is definitively fixed in the per-
spective of self-choice. It is precisely in this perspective that the consciousness of possibi-
lity, which is nevertheless ineradicable despite all undeniable determination, and in this 
sense a consciousness of freedom, finds its continuing confirmation (for details see Wand-
schneider 1979). 
 
5. Determination by Unconscious Brain Processes? (Libet Experiments) 
 
Well, this optimism about freedom is now facing massive doubts on the part of brain 
research. The background to this is the research carried out more than 20 years ago by 
Benjamin Libet, which was later repeated and confirmed in modified form by Patrick 
Haggard and Martin Eimer (1999). John-Dylan Haynes has recently reviewed these results 
again and expanded them considerably (Haynes et al. 2008). 
The central point of these experiments is the proof that a supposedly fully consci-
ously executed action is actually initiated unconsciously and only becomes conscious af-
terwards – shortly before it is executed. The investigations of Libet and later of Hag-
gard/Eimer showed that ca. 550 milliseconds before the action an action potential is built 
up, but the decision to act only becomes conscious ca. 200 milliseconds before the action. 
According the consciousness does not decide anything, but only registers what has already 
been unconsciously decided. However, it has no knowledge of this itself. Rather, it is of 
the unwavering opinion that it has decided freely. Since this is actually not true, it appears 
from a brain physiological perspective that this supposed freedom is simply an illusion, a 
psychological-cultural construct of consciousness (e.g. Roth 1997, 303 ff; 2004, 218 ff; 
Singer 2003, 24 ff; Prinz 2004, 20 ff). 
That the empirical findings are not artefacts has been confirmed by subsequently   
conducted extended experiments of John-Dylan Haynes' team and others (Haynes et al. 
2008; Schnabel 2008). In the case of Libet and Haggard/Eimer, a button had to be pressed 
once. In Haynes' improved experiment design, the subject could also choose between right 
and left hand. The main results of these experiments were: (1) The action potential that in-
itiates the action is built up much earlier than Libet had found, namely not only half a se-
cond before the action is executed, but – taking into account various corrections – up to 10 
seconds before. (2) The trick was undoubtedly that the neurological measurement could 
predict with a probability far above random whether the action would be executed by the 
right or the left hand. 
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You rub your eyes. The thought experiment of Donald MacKay described above is 
beginning to lose its fictional character and become reality. The unconscious guides my 
actions. The brain researcher looks at the screen and predicts my decisions. While the ar-
gument against fatalism remains valid – if the brain researcher would tell me the result of 
his measurement, I would not be bound to it, but would possibly make new and different 
decisions – but isn't a human being's self-choice made possible by knowledge, as it was 
previously pretended, from a brain physiological point of view simply a vain illusion, as 
the neuro-protagonists already mentioned (Roth, Singer, Prinz) never tire of proclaiming? 
A hint from Libet himself makes one sit up and take notice: Within the scope of his 
measurements, after the action is unconsciously initiated and then becomes conscious, the-
re are still 100 to 200 milliseconds left until the action is carried out. This time span, ac-
cording to Libet, can be used by the consciousness appearing on the neurological stage to 
veto the unconsciously initiated action if necessary (Libet 2007, 177 ff). Libet has also 
conducted experiments on this which seem to confirm this. In Haynes' project, this Libet 
hypothesis is also to be newly and comprehensively investigated, which is still pending. 
If Libet's view were to be confirmed, I think that would be a fundamentally impor-
tant point in the debate on determinism. We would then have a situation in which the ac-
tion, although unconsciously initiated, is, as it were, first presented to the consciousness 
for 'ratification' before it is carried out. Its function is therefore by no means limited to 
merely 'nodding off' decisions that have long since been made unconsciously. 
Perhaps a maximum of 200 milliseconds does not offer as much leisure as would be 
desirable for far-reaching decisions, and this is where criticism comes in: "A snap of the 
finger is not yet a choice of partner", reads the title of Bettina Walde (2004), for example. 
We all know decision-making processes that drag on for hours, days or even much longer. 
In such cases the consciousness sees itself called upon to mobilize or even expand its 
knowledge in order to come to a decision appropriate to it. And this is nothing other than 
the previously pointed process of conscious self-choice. 
How then? One must remember that the unconscious decision to act as the phyloge-
netic heritage of all animal subjects is in fact the normal case. Consciousness is so to 
speak the last great invention of evolution. But even before that, animal subjects had to 
make behavioral decisions, i.e. unconscious decisions that were nevertheless adequate in 
terms of biological survival. This program is still effective within us; it forms the vital, 
and that also means: emotional basis for action. It remains – as the Libet experiments te-
stify – also a prerequisite for conscious actions, because consciousness, as already men-
tioned, is based on it as an evolutionarily late achievement. However, it is essential, as Li-
bet emphasizes, that the result of these unconscious decision-making processes is ultima-
tely presented to consciousness for 'ratification'. Even Singer emphasizes that the human 
brain is able to "put reactions to stimuli on hold and weigh up decisions to act" in order to 
"check what the consequences of certain reactions would be" on the basis of "internal mo-
dels" (Singer 2002, 71). 
Well, this opens the window to the reasons of knowledge, which, as explained, can 
bring its enormous power to bear. More is not needed for the possibility of conscious self-
choice. Brain research that seemed to reveal our autonomy consciousness as a cultural 
construct as an illusion, on the contrary only confirms that option, if understood properly. 
 
6. Free Action – Determinated by the Idea of Free Action 
 
With the consciousness of possible self-choice, a decisive novum has now occurred: 
This awareness of a principled non-fixedness, of an unlimited horizon of possibility itself 
now becomes a determinant of my actions. I act in this way, although in fact determined in 
many respects, in the awareness of basically unlimited possibilities, and this is an action 
of a completely different quality than without this awareness: The set of action-
determining norms is here, as it were, augmented by a further norm; it reads: 'Choose free-
ly, according to your ability to choose freely'; an attitude, therefore, that knows itself as 
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autonomy and wants itself as autonomy and is motivated in this way to transite boundaries 
and prove itself as autonomous (Wandschneider 1979). 
The decisive point is therefore: The autonomy-consciousness itself now belongs to 
the high-ranking determining factors of my actions and thus develops a mighty 'determi-
ning' force: I will do everything to comply with this norm of autonomous self-choice, 
which determines my self-image as a human being from the ground up. The idea of free-
dom is thus not an empty, inconsequential thought, but determines the real actions of 
man, which in this form appears to be downright determinated to autonomy. Kant's dic-
tum: "Every being that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom is really free 
in practical regard" (Kant GMS 448), touches upon this central point of the problem of 
freedom. 
The possibility of self-choice is thus characterized by the fact that determination and 
freedom converge, as it were. The undifferentiated talk of 'determination' fails to recogni-
ze that determination in the form of self-choice turns into freedom. As long as this is not 
understood, the problem of freedom necessarily retains an aporetic character. 
It should be noted that autonomy realized as self-choice also contains constitutive 
determination, and is thus freedom of choice, not freedom of will – but it comes hugely  
close to it. Or should we better say: It is, properly understood, exactly the freedom of will 
that we actually have in mind? For pure freedom of will, a will without a specific will, in 
which Schopenhauer is to be right, is an absurdity (Schopenhauer GE, Chap. II, esp. p. 
60). But it is also clear that the abstract opposition of freedom and determination is a false 
alternative. The Pothast-option for determinism mentioned at the beginning, due to the 
considerations developed, I think, has been more differentiated stated and has thus also 
undergone a correction. This was here the recognition-leading interest. 
So also in self-choice the will is determinated, but now it is determined by self-
chosen 'mental' determinants, i.e. ideas, principles, reasons, logical bonds etc: Thus, final-
ly, another essential aspect of autonomy becomes visible. The real point here is that this 
mental form of determination can be so strong that I am – for others and for myself – 
downright predictable. 
Admittedly, in view of the aforementioned MacKay thought experiment leading to 
the result that my actions cannot be taken as fixed by my respective brain state, this now 
seems paradoxical. Because the information concerning the prediction of my action, as 
had been argued, will change my brain state and thus lead to a changed behaviour. Well, 
this is apparently only true if I do not agree with the result of the prediction that was 
communicated to me, and that means: if it would contradict my behavioral principles. But 
for a 'person with principles' this is not to be expected: Certainly for him, too, it remains 
true that the state of his brain changes with every new piece of information. But telling an 
'ethically stable' person: 'you will act ethically' does not contain any essentially new in-
formation for him; just that he has already known himself, so that his motivation does not 
change. Or, to put it another way: The 'principle-controlled brain states' – if I may express 
myself in this way – are, so to speak, characterized by a special constancy, because they 
are highest-ranked principles in the mental hierarchy and therefore cannot be 'swirled' by 
arbitrary, banal information. MacKay's thought experiment argues abstractly neu-
rologically and is therefore blind to different mental attitudes and especially to the situati-
on of conscious self-determination. 
Epistemic indeterminism (see above) has been replaced here, so to speak, by episte-
mic determinism: By those mental-epistemic principles, action is maximally fixed. And at 
the same time this self-chosen determination means a maximum of autonomy – not only 
the system autonomy of the physical level, nor simply autonomy through knowledge, but 
autonomy as self-choice, so to speak a determination in the way of  a self-determination 
for freedom. 
Here it must be remembered that the mental determinants mentioned – following 
Kant, Hegel in particular saw this in all clarity – are in fact not a power foreign to man, 
who is spirit in an essential sense, but his own being. To submit to them is therefore not 
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alienation, but, and this is finally still a Hegelian point, to be with oneself. As a spiritual 
being, I am, so to speak, all the more with myself and in such a way self-determining, the 
more I orientate myself by the principles that are constitutive for spirit: by the principles 
of reason and thus of logic. Thus the doubts mentioned above (ch. 1) regarding the argu-
ment 'truth requires freedom' are refuted. 
This corresponds to the fact that logic itself represents the sphere of absolute auto-
nomy, because and in so far as it cannot be grounded by an illogical instance, as groun-
ding is itself an innerlogical relationship, with other words: Logic – logic in a fundamen-
tal sense – can only be thought of as self-grounding, self-determining – but that is a diffe-
rent issue (on this see Wandschneider 2013, chapters 1.1 and 6.3). 
Yet so much is clear that true self-determination can never be arbitrary. Only by 
strict adherence to the principles of reason I can be truly autonomous. Therefore, true au-
tonomy is just as much of a commitment: Commitment to the principles of reason and thus 
essentially reasonable self-determination. Only then, when I bind myself to rational prin-
ciples, do I, on the one hand, realize the maximum possible autonomy for human beings, 
and, on the other hand, through this, I first of all gain a spiritual profile that is stable in 
the vicissitudes of life, a spiritual identity. 
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